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‘Who is in and who is out? – these are the first questions that any political 
community must answer about itself ’ (Walzer 1993: 55). We can agree with 
Michael Walzer on this point, but there is one important question that 
precedes asking who is in and who is out and that is, why are we in this together 
in the first place? How did a concrete political community come into being, and 
why does it still exist? How does a person find himself or herself in a particular 
community whose members are then recognized as co-citizens? And, are we 
all satisfied with the existing legal, political and social arrangements within 
the shared polity? Maybe we want our political community to be organized 
differently, or we want to belong to an entirely different community, one 
that exists or the one that is yet to be? In short, every political community is 
confronted with the why of its existence, having to convince its members – or 
at least a good portion of them – that they do belong together. This is what I 
call the citizenship argument of a political community.
Every polity exists and reproduces itself through a mutually solidifying 
interplay between the citizenship argument on which a political community is 
based and its legal codifications, including the laws on citizenship that clearly 
define who is in and who is out. The mutually reinforcing or opposing tensions 
between the citizenship argument (a widely shared narrative of the ‘why are we 
in this together’) and the legal provisions defining and reproducing citizenship 
and citizenry are the fundaments on which every modern state citizenship is 
based. Rarely can we find communities without contestations and struggles over 
the citizenship argument, i.e. definition of political community, its borders, its 
nature and the organization of social, economic and political life. In this respect, 
the definition and internal organization of every political community at any given 
moment is the outcome of the hegemonic citizenship argument that remains 
in constant polemic with counterhegemonic (alternative, radically different or 
even historic) ones. Thus, no community is stable, although some are more so 
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than others. The collision of different citizenship arguments might lead to a 
crisis that, in turn, can lead to a change (redefinition of political communities, 
both as entities and internally) or to a reversal of hegemonic positions. This 
Gramscian perspective on citizenship allows us, in these final pages, to take 
another perspective on what was presented in the preceding chapters and to 
examine how hegemonic struggles (dominant narratives, counternarratives, 
crises, changes or reversals of positions) over the main citizenship arguments 
and their counterarguments were played out in Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav 
states over the last century.
Wars usually open up space for the flourishing of political ideas on what 
ought to come ‘after the war’. The Yugoslav unification in December 1918 
annulled all other political options that might have been thinkable such 
as a reformed Austria-Hungary, separate South Slavic states or a greater 
Serbia. It confronted two main visions of how the unified country should 
be organized internally. Two citizenship arguments clashed: the unitary 
and the federal vision of the new state. This conflict came to dominate the 
twenty-two years of the existence of the first Yugoslavia and to determine the 
political alignments of the main political forces, with Serbian parties generally 
favouring unitarism, Croat and Slovene nationalists as well as communists 
mostly advocating federalization of Yugoslavia, and some also calling for its 
disintegration (e.g. radical Croat and Macedonian nationalists but also, for 
different reasons, the communists during the period 1924–1934). The end 
of the Second World War and the victory of the communist-led resistance 
movement brought the triumph of federalism over both the unitarist vision of 
Yugoslavia and nationalist (and mostly fascist) ideas about ethnonational and 
ethnically cleansed national states (the Ustashas’ Independent State of Croatia 
and visions of a Greater Serbia, within or without Yugoslavia, promoted by the 
Chetnik leaders).
Socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1990) introduced the two-tier citizenship, 
comprising the federal supranational citizenship and the republic-level 
citizenship that had a civic nature. This meant that one would claim his/her 
republican citizenship based on place of birth, residence or parents’ republican 
citizenship and not on his or her ethnonational belonging. However, the 
federal citizenship regime went through important transformations that 
were themselves a product of the conflict between centralist and decentralist 
visions of the Yugoslav socialist state. We can say that the federal centralizing 
citizenship argument dominated between 1945 and 1967 and that it was, with 
the constitutional changes between 1967 and the last Yugoslav constitution 
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in 1974, replaced by the confederal argument that politically empowered the 
units over the federal centre. The federal and confederal citizenship regimes 
had two main enemies: unitarism, usually coupled with Serb nationalism, and 
separatism, usually associated with nationalism of smaller nations.
The return of multi-party electoral competition (at the level of the republics) in 
1990 was coupled with almost complete delegitimization of the main arguments 
on which socialist Yugoslavia existed: federal/confederal arrangements that in 
the view of Yugoslav communists solved the national question and socialist 
self-management as political and social ideology of the entire community of 
citizens. The delegitimization process resulted in the reversal of positions: ethnic 
nationalism became hegemonic ideology. The nationalist reversal basically 
opened the doors for the argument claiming that true political communities, 
in which liberal democracy can be practiced, were neither to be found in 
the republics nor at the level of the Yugoslav federation but in the existing 
ethnonational communities. In other words, the ethnonational argument 
started to undermine the idea of civically constituted political communities at 
the republican level and eventually invalidated the idea that there was a political 
community at the Yugoslav supranational level.
However, the conflict between civic and ethnocentric arguments, the 
former advocated by the liberal or the left-leaning forces and the latter by the 
conservative and the nationalist forces, has continued to unfold in all post-
Yugoslav political communities until this very day. In addition, in some states, 
we also witnessed the emergence of the multiethnic argument as the basis for 
internal organization, promoted by the international community as part of the 
peace and post-conflict processes. Although the emphasis here is also placed 
on the ethnic groups, it underlines their plurality and seeks solutions that will 
manage their relationship. Thus, the history of the last twenty-five years in 
the post-Yugoslav states can be told based on which one of these arguments 
was hegemonic at what point and what were its main counterhegemonic 
competitors. However, the political outcomes of these ideological struggles are 
never straightforward. Although the ethnocentric argument might dominate 
the political scene and society, the constitutional arrangements or citizenship 
laws often combine both ethnocentric and civic elements, mostly due to 
internal contestations but also international pressures. In other words, a state 
is often defined as ‘belonging’ to a majority ethnic group but with minorities 
also accepted into citizenship; the ethnocentric principle dominates the public 
life and state symbols but civic loyalty towards the state is expected from all 
citizens, including minorities; ethnocentric states often claim that they do not 
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discriminate between majority and minorities and that they fully conform to 
international human rights norms.
The ethnocentric argument is dominant in Slovenia, Croatia and 
Macedonia (until the 2001 Ohrid Peace Framework) and in Serbia (even 
constitutionally after 2006). This prevalence of ethnocentrism in constitutions, 
citizenship laws and political life (resulting in what we termed, following 
Sammy Smooha, ethnic democracies; see Chapter 9), and at times formal 
or informal discrimination of those not belonging to the core ethnic group, 
is countered by the civic argument demanding legal and formal equality 
of all citizens. Another counterhegemonic argument to be found in these 
states is the multiethnic argument. Usually advocated by minorities, it can 
encompass demands ranging from better representation mechanisms (other 
South Slavic minorities in Slovenia) and even more territorial autonomy 
(Albanian parties in Macedonia) to open separatism (e.g. the Serb rebellion 
in Croatia between 1991 and 1995; present as well in the Albanian rebellion in 
Macedonia in 2001). In this group, Serbia represents a special case. Although 
ethnocentrism has been dominating Serbia’s political life since the late 1980s, 
it was not enshrined in legislation until the 2004 citizenship law and the 
new 2006 Constitution. Before that, Serbia was part of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and was nominally a civic state. Serbia abolished Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989; a 90 per cent strong Albanian majority in this region 
opted for secession and independence and countered the Serbian state with 
the creation of a parallel society, and later with armed rebellion. Today, Serbia 
is defined in ethnocentric terms. Other citizenship arguments in this country 
include civic, multiethnic (more autonomy for minorities, for which there is 
a constitutional basis as well) but also an autonomist one (more autonomy for 
the region of Vojvodina).
The civic argument seems to dominate only in Montenegro. In the 1990s, 
the Montenegrin civic principle went hand in hand with political unionism 
with Serbia, based on the then widely shared belief that Montenegrins are 
ethnonationally Serbs. However, not everyone agreed so the counterarguments 
asked for the equal position for Montenegrins as a nation (bi-national union) 
or even advocated independence. The independentist argument won the day 
at the Montenegrin referendum on independence in 2006. Montenegro today 
is defined strictly as a civic state with no ethnic majority (ethnic Montenegrins 
make up 45 per cent of the population), which is opposed by those who either 
advocate multiethnic redefinition (Serbs, but some other minorities as well) or 
closer ties with Serbia.
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Wartime Bosnia-Herzegovina was also defined as a civic republic of all 
its citizens, but that was only in legislation; the reality on the ground echoed 
the military victories of ethnocentrist and separatist forces. However, the 
country survived the war and avoided partition. The Dayton Peace agreement 
abolished the civic constitution and introduced multiethnic division at all levels, 
dominated by three major groups in often-paralysing consociational settlement. 
This Dayton argument has its opponents; on the one hand, we can hear demands 
for further ethnofederalism (the Serb Republic and Croat-dominated cantons) 
or even secession (the Serb Republic) and, on the other, for re-centralization and 
territorial unification coming mostly from the Bosniak-dominated areas.
The multiethnic argument seems to be on offer as a ‘solution’ to all post-
conflict societies. For example, in Macedonia after the 2001 conflict, the country 
was redefined from ethnocentric to multiethnic, which resulted in stronger 
minority representation and political influence, but also in more autonomy at 
the municipal level. That peace agreement seems to be to no one’s liking: the civil 
society sector calls for a civic solution, Macedonian nationalists for domination 
of their majority and Albanian nationalists oscillate between ethnofederalist 
and secessionist options. Finally, internationally supervised Kosovo, after 
its declaration of independence, is imagined (and managed) as both a civic – 
residence-based citizenship and formal equality of all citizens – and multiethnic 
polity (separate communities have special rights to representation, whereas 
the Serb minority can aspire to a broader municipal autonomy). Opposing 
visions abound. Many Kosovar Albanians believe that the 90 per cent Albanian 
majority makes Kosovo in reality the second ethnic Albanian polity, which is a 
position often coupled with proposals for unity with Albania. As for the Serb 
minority, apart from re-integration with Serbia, their representatives either ask 
for multiethnic arrangements similar to those in Bosnia or for the secession of 
the Serb area in North Kosovo and its reincorporation into Serbia.
Out of this brief tour, we can distil four major arguments about the limits 
and forms of political community present in Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav 
states between 1914 and 2014. The civic argument implies equality and unity of 
all citizens. It neglects ethnonational identities, the primary identity markers in 
this region, thus running a risk of (unintentionally or not) promoting, under 
the cover of citizens’ unity, the domination of one group over the other(s). The 
ethnocentric argument implies a distinction between an ethnic majority and 
minorities and thus the political, social and cultural domination of the core 
group. Usually it entails legal guarantees for minority members and sometimes 
even extensive cultural and political rights, but the ‘ownership’ of the state is in 
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the hands of the majority group. This argument often results in conflicts, violent 
or not, over the relationship between majority and minority (or minorities). 
Since the state is defined as being owned by an ethnonational group, which 
often includes even those members not living within the state boundaries, 
this might lead to inter-state tensions, especially if designated co-ethnics live 
just across the border. The multiethnic argument, on the contrary, is based on 
the recognition of dominant ethnic groups as primary political communities 
in a common state. Politics is then posited on consociational rules and often 
assumes some kind of ethnofederal territorial arrangements. It does not leave 
much space for non-ethnic and purely civic identities and, moreover, it does 
not alleviate the risk of conflicts or disintegration. Finally, the fourth argument 
is supranational. We can see it at work in socialist Yugoslavia and to a certain 
extent in the EU integration process. It means that political communities at the 
level of subunits are recognized as autonomous and even primary sovereign 
bodies but a common framework offers a possibility for a higher supranational 
political identity. Socialist Yugoslavia in this respect was an example of a relatively 
functional supranational political community. In the EU – which Slovenia and 
Croatia have joined and into which all other post-Yugoslav states aspire to 
integrate as well – the role of its institutions, including European citizenship, 
does not seriously challenge the primacy of national member states.
In this epilogue, I have presented the dominant arguments in the Yugoslav 
and the post-Yugoslav political entities and how their hegemonic struggles 
resulted in various constitutional arrangements and political practices. The 
three states named Yugoslavia clearly testify to the sometimes productive and 
sometimes conflicting co-existence of various citizenship arguments. The 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a unitary state, with a civic citizenship regime, 
that at the same time insisted on national unity but progressively recognized 
various independent group identities. The second socialist Yugoslavia was 
supranational at the federal level and civic at the level of republics, whilst its 
multiethnic composition was promoted, recognized and respected. Finally, the 
third rump Yugoslavia in the 1990s, with the exclusion and self-exclusion of 
Kosovo Albanians, was dominated by Serb ethnocentrism that not only reduced 
the official supranational element of its federal citizenship but also corroded the 
civic definition of the republican citizenships of Serbia and Montenegro.
Finally, one has to add to the arguments about the definition, organization 
and limits of a political community the ideological conflict over its social 
composition and economic functioning, i.e. in this case, between socialist and 
capitalist visions. Socialist Yugoslavia designated working class and working 
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people as equal bearers of sovereignty alongside with the republics, their citizens 
and the Yugoslav nations. Its socialist character supported the supranational 
citizenship argument and, in addition, an internationalist worldview. Since 1990 
homogenous ethnonational communities have been held to be the main sites of 
liberal democratic politics coupled with the neoliberal engineering of a socially 
hierarchical society.
The liberal vision of legal equality and the respect for human rights sees the 
completion of the post-socialist ‘transition’ of the post-Yugoslav states in their 
integration into the EU. In this respect, this liberal argument insists on civic 
values, preferably within a supranational EU framework. However, we can detect 
today an emerging argument that is not only putting in question the predominant 
ethnonational character of the new states (as discriminatory), and liberal 
democracy (as not sufficiently democratic and inclusive), but also, increasingly, 
the neoliberal capitalist restructuring of these societies (due to social injustices 
and widening inequalities). This new citizenship argument, brought about by 
growing progressive and left-wing social and political movements (see Horvat 
and Štiks 2015), accepts the given boundaries of the political communities (while 
looking beyond them in a wider regional and internationalist perspective), but 
insists that every political community must be a community of self-governing 
and politically and socially equal citizens.
Future studies will surely trace the continuing transformations of political 
communities inhabiting the post-Yugoslav space, where the rich and contested 
heritage of the last one hundred years of citizenship will continue to resonate.
